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GIBNEY v. EVOLUTION MARKETING RESEARCH, LLC
 In December 2001, Enron filed for what was at the time the largest corporate 
bankruptcy in U.S. history.1 In little over a year, amid increasing investor scrutiny, 
accusations of fraud, and a series of disclosures of financial irregularities, the 
company’s stock price had plunged from ninety dollars per share in August 2000 to 
less than one dollar per share in November 2001.2 Seven months after Enron’s 
record-breaking bankruptcy filing, WorldCom (now MCI Inc.) shattered Enron’s 
record with its own massive bankruptcy filing.3 As was true with Enron, WorldCom’s 
collapse owed much of its impetus to accounting irregularities and allegations of 
fraud.4 In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)5 in response to 
such scandals.6 Upon signing SOX into law, President George W. Bush called the 
legislation “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the 
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”7
 Title VIII of SOX, known as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability 
Act of 20028 (“the Act” or “Title VIII”), established, inter alia, § 1514A, a 
“whistleblower”9 protection provision for certain individuals involved with publicly 
traded companies.10 As a whole, SOX aims “[t]o protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures,”11 while Title VIII “provide[s] for 
criminal prosecution and enhanced penalties of persons who defraud investors in 
publicly traded securities  .  .  . and for other purposes.”12 SOX also emphasizes the 
1. John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 18 (2006). See 
generally Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing 
Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2003) (providing a definitive literary account of Enron’s meteoric 
rise and subsequent collapse).
2. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Enron Collapses as 
Suitor Cancels Plans for Merger, N.Y. Times (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/
business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enron-collapses-as-suitor-cancels-plans-for-merger.html.
3. Todd Wallack, Biggest U.S. Bankruptcy Ever: WorldCom Filing, Expected by Wall Street, Could Further 
Shake Confidence of Small Investors, SFGate (July 22, 2002, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/ 
article/Biggest-U-S-bankruptcy-ever-WorldCom-filing-2792832.php.
4. See id.
5. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
6. See S. Rep. No. 107 -205, at 1–2 (2002); Greg Farrell & USA Today, WorldCom’s Whistle-Blower Tells Her 
Story, ABC News (Feb. 15, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=4295223.
7. Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2 Pub. Papers 1319, 1319 (July 30, 2002).
8. See S. Rep. No. 107-146 (2002).
9. Broadly defined, a whistleblower is “[o]ne who reveals wrongdoing within an organization to the public 
or to those in positions of authority.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 2035 (3d ed. 1992). To “blow the whistle” is “[t]o expose a wrongdoing in the hope of bringing 
it to a halt.” Id. For an interesting discussion about the origins of the term in an organizational context, 
see generally Wim Vandekerckhove, Whistleblowing and Organizational Social 
Responsibility: A Global Assessment (2006).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
11. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
12. S. Rep. No. 107 -146, at 2.
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importance of shareholders as seen in the Senate report on the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002.13 Section 1514A of SOX 
provides, in relevant part, that any publicly traded company, or any contractor of 
such a company, may not discriminate against an employee who, acting lawfully and 
under reasonable belief, exposes or facilitates the exposure of information that the 
company’s conduct is violating: (1) certain sections of SOX;14 (2) any rules 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); or (3) any federal 
laws prohibiting fraud against shareholders.15
 In 2014, the Supreme Court extended § 1514A’s whistleblower protection in 
Lawson v. FMR LLC.16 In Lawson, the Court granted certiorari to resolve an 
interpretive conf lict between the First Circuit and the Department of Labor’s 
Administrative Review Board (ARB) regarding whether § 1514A’s whistleblower 
protection extended to the employees of privately held contractors who perform work 
for publicly traded companies.17 The First Circuit held that § 1514A’s whistleblower 
protection did not apply to employees of privately held contractors;18 whereas in a 
later decision19 the ARB held, “§ 1514A affords whistleblower protection to 
employees of privately held contractors that render services to public companies.”20 
The petitioners in Lawson were employees of private contractors who provided 
management and advisory services to several mutual funds.21 After one employee 
raised concerns regarding certain cost accounting methodologies, and another about 
inaccuracies in a draft SEC registration statement, both suffered retaliation by the 
13. S. Rep. No. 107-205, at 2, 15, 19 (2002) (explaining that auditors’ primary duties are to shareholders, 
acting on behalf of the shareholders, and acting in the best interest of shareholders).
14. The sections specified are §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
15. Id. Under the statute, discrimination is in the “terms and conditions of employment” such as failing to 
promote, demoting, firing, suspending, threatening, harassing, or other actions. Id. § 1514A(a).
16. 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1165–66, 1176 (2014).
17. Id. at 1164–65.
18. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 83 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1158.
19. See Spinner v. David Landau & Assocs., ARB Nos. 10-111, 10-115, 2012 WL 1999677, at *12 (U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor May 31, 2012).
20. See Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1165 (citing Spinner, 2012 WL 1999677).
21. Id. at 1164. A mutual fund is a company that pools money from numerous investors and uses those 
funds to invest in securities (most commonly stocks and corporate or government-issued bonds). Mutual 
Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs)—A Guide for Investors, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/investor/
pubs/inwsmf.htm (last modified Jan. 26, 2017). Collectively, these investments constitute the fund’s 
portfolio, which is managed by an investment advisor. Id. Investors purchase and sell shares directly 
from the mutual fund itself. Id. Mutual funds are required to sell their shares at the net asset value, 
which is calculated by taking the mutual fund’s assets minus its liabilities. Id. However, the mutual fund 
must price its shares each day, and most do so after the U.S. stock market closes for the day. Id. 
Therefore, when purchasing shares, an investor will not know the price until the next day. Id. The 
purchased shares constitute a proportionate ownership of the fund’s holdings and any resulting income 
from them. Id.
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contractor.22 Both employees subsequently brought complaints alleging retaliation in 
violation of § 1514A.23 Reversing a divided First Circuit,24 the Supreme Court 
extended § 1514A’s protection to employees of private contractors serving publicly 
traded companies who blew the whistle on fraud perpetrated by those companies.25
 Slightly more than three months after the Supreme Court decided Lawson, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was faced with the 
decision of whether to further extend § 1514A’s whistleblower protection, and 
declined to do so. In Gibney v. Evolution Marketing Research, LLC, the court held 
that § 1514A did not extend protection to the plaintiff Leo Gibney, an employee 
who blew the whistle on alleged fraud perpetrated by his employer against the 
company for which his employer was a contractor—and thus, indirectly, that 
company’s shareholders.26 Gibney’s employer, Evolution Marketing Research 
(“Evolution”) subsequently terminated him, so he brought a claim alleging wrongful 
termination in violation of § 1514A, naming Evolution as the defendant.27
 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that Gibney fell outside the scope of 
§ 1514A.28 Gibney based his claim on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawson, and 
argued that as an employee of a contractor who blew the whistle on activity that 
would, albeit indirectly, defraud the shareholders of a public company, he fell within 
the expanded purview of § 1514A.29 The defendant, Evolution, argued for a narrower 
reading: that the Supreme Court in Lawson did not support extending SOX 
protection to employees of a private contractor for a public company who report fraud 
that was not committed by the public company and had no connection to the 
company’s shareholders.30 Evolution argued that § 1514A was unavailable to Gibney 
because Evolution’s client, the publicly traded pharmaceutical giant Merck & Co. 
(“Merck”), did not commit the alleged fraud.31
 This case comment contends that the Gibney court erred in declining to extend 
§ 1514A’s whistleblower protection. First, the court unduly focused on the discussion 
by the Supreme Court in Lawson regarding the particularities of the mutual fund 
industry. Second, the court failed to give proper weight to the statutory text of § 1514A. 
22. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1164.
23. Id.
24. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that § 1514A barred retaliation by a 
contractor against a public company’s employees, but not against its own, id. at 68, and basing its 
decision in part on the title of section 806 of SOX: “Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded 
Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud”; and on the caption under § 1514A(a): “Whistleblower 
protection for employees of publicly traded companies,” id. at 69), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1158.
25. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1161.
26. 25 F. Supp. 3d 741, 747–48 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
27. Id. at 742.
28. Id. at 747–48.
29. Id. at 742, 744.
30. Id. at 746.
31. Id. at 746–47.
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Third, the court failed to give due weight to Congress’s broader legislative purpose in 
enacting § 1514A and SOX in its entirety. The court’s decision is likely to engender 
significant negative repercussions. Contractor employees who uncover wrongdoing by 
their employers against publicly traded companies will be discouraged from exposing 
the wrongdoing, to the ultimate detriment of not only individual company shareholders, 
but also the broader public confidence in the securities market as a whole. At the same 
time, this ruling is likely to embolden unscrupulous contractors, potentially leading to 
both greater instances and greater magnitudes of fraud. In turn, companies wishing to 
protect themselves against such fraud may have to expend greater resources to do so, as 
this court’s decision will deter contractor employees from exposing fraud to the 
company for fear of retaliation from their bosses.
 Leo Gibney was employed by Evolution from October 2009 until his termination 
on November 7, 2011.32 During that time, Evolution contracted with Merck to 
provide consulting services.33 While serving as Evolution’s agent on a Merck project 
known as Cogent, Gibney allegedly discovered that Evolution was fraudulently 
billing Merck for certain services, in violation of the contract between the two 
entities.34 Gibney reported his objections to this billing practice to Evolution’s chief 
operating officer and general counsel.35 Two days later, he was terminated.36
 On January 23, 2012, Gibney filed an administrative complaint with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).37 On April 1, 2014, after 
OSHA failed to take action within 180 days, Gibney filed a pro se complaint in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.38 On June 10, 2014, the court granted Evolution’s 
32. Id. at 742.
33. Id.
34. Id. The alleged fraud was essentially a form of double billing, whereby Evolution subcontracted out 
various services and recouped the cost of doing so by billing Merck for those services as out-of-pocket 
fees; when according to the contract between Evolution and Merck, the cost of providing those services 
was to be included within the separate category of professional fees. Id. Rather than paying the 
subcontractors out of the professional fees it received from Merck, Evolution retained the entirety of 
those fees and separately recouped its subcontracting costs by mislabeling the subcontracted work. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 743. In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which broadened OSHA’s 
whistleblower authority and gave OSHA the ability to protect employees from employer retaliation. The 
Whistleblower Protection Programs, U.S. Dep’t Lab., https://www.whistleblowers.gov/index.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2017). According to OSHA’s guidelines, an employee of a “SOX covered” employer may 
file a SOX complaint with OSHA. OSHA, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Fact Sheet: Filing 
Whistleblower Complaints Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2011), https://www.osha.gov/
Publications/osha-factsheet-sox-act.pdf. A company is considered “covered by section 806 of [SOX] if it 
has a class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act or is required to file 
reports under Section 15(d) of that Act. Its subsidiaries, contractors, subcontractors, or agents may also 
be covered.” Id. An employee can file a complaint in writing or by calling or visiting an OSHA office. Id. 
If OSHA does not issue a finding and order within 180 days of the employee filing, the employee may 
file in federal court. Id.
38. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 743; see 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2012) (directing a person alleging 
discrimination under the section to first file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, and then to file for 
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motion to dismiss.39 The court rejected Gibney’s argument that he should be covered 
under § 1514A, stating that to do so required a definition of SOX protection that was 
“impermissibly broad.”40 The court also stated thus, unlike the plaintiff ’s case in 
Lawson, Gibney’s case did not involve the intricacies associated with the mutual fund 
industry, so extending § 1514A’s protection was not justified.41 Moreover, even though 
the court acknowledged that the issue of whether Gibney’s claims fell outside the 
scope of SOX was a “close question,”42 it ultimately agreed with Evolution’s argument 
that Gibney’s complaint was outside the scope of SOX because it did not allege that 
Evolution assisted or otherwise was involved with fraud committed by Merck.43
 In agreeing with Evolution’s argument, the court referenced Safarian v. American 
DG Energy Inc.44 In Safarian, the plaintiff performed engineering services for the 
defendant, a publicly traded company; however, Multiservice, a company the plaintiff 
owned, paid the plaintiff.45 In this case, the court found that the plaintiff, an 
engineer, was not involved in accounting or taxation practices, and did not report an 
issue with corporate disclosures.46 Thus, the plaintiff ’s disclosures did not fit into 
SOX’s purpose of protecting investors by improving disclosures and monitoring 
auditors, accountants, and lawyers.47 The Gibney court also quoted the court in 
Harvey v. Safeway, which stated, “[SOX] was not intended to capture every complaint 
an employee might have as a potential violation of the Act. Rather, the goal of the 
legislation was to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws.”48
 This case comment argues that the Gibney court made three primary errors in 
failing to extend § 1514A’s protection to contractor employees who allege indirect 
shareholder fraud perpetrated by their contractor against a publicly traded company. 
First, the court unduly emphasized that Lawson dealt with alleged fraud in the 
context of the mutual fund industry. In doing so, the court failed to adequately 
consider factual similarities, which if given due consideration would have compelled 
ruling for the plaintiff. Second, the court failed to give proper weight to the statutory 
text of § 1514A, failing to take proper cognizance of the deliberately broad statutory 
de novo review in the appropriate district court if the Secretary does not issue a decision within 180 days).
39. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 749.
40. Id. at 747.
41. Id.
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 747–48.
44. Id. at 748; see Safarian v. Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 10-6082, 2014 WL 1744989 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), 
aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 622 Fed. App’x 149 (3d Cir. 2015).
45. Safarian, 2014 WL 1744989, at *1.
46. Id. at *4 –5. 
47. Id.
48. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 748 (quoting Harvey v. Safeway, 2005 WL 4889073, at *3 (U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor Feb. 11, 2005)).
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language. Third, the court failed to give due weight to the broad legislative and 
remedial purposes behind § 1514A and SOX. The court focused on the legislative 
history that discusses the specific desire to avoid Enron-like scandals in the future, 
but failed to consider the broader purposes behind SOX, and behind securities 
regulation reform in general.
 First, the Gibney court overemphasized a distinguishing factor in Lawson: that 
the case involved a mutual fund with no employees of its own.49 The Supreme Court 
noted in Lawson that because of the unique structure of mutual funds, its decision to 
extend whistleblower protection to the petitioners would “avoid[] insulating the 
entire mutual fund industry from § 1514A.”50 As the Court explained, this fact 
bolstered its broader reading of the term “employee” to include more than merely 
employees of public companies themselves because “mutual funds unquestionably are 
governed by § 1514A” and “[v]irtually all mutual funds  .  .  . have no employees of 
their own.”51 The Court further pointed out that “Congress presumably had [mutual 
funds] in mind” in constructing the provision.52
 In adopting this broader interpretation of “employee,” however, the Court in 
Lawson was not focused solely or even primarily on the particular nature of the 
mutual fund industry. Rather, it focused extensively on “parallel statutory texts and 
whistleblower protective aims.”53 In dismissing the narrower interpretation the 
dissent would have taken, the Court noted that the narrower reading would result in 
“a huge hole” because the “[c]ontractors’ employees  .  .  . would be vulnerable to 
retaliation by their employers for blowing the whistle on a scheme to defraud the 
public company’s investors, even a scheme engineered entirely by the contractor.”54 The 
Court then invited the dissent to “pause to consider whether a Congress, prompted 
by the Enron debacle, would exclude from whistleblower protection countless 
professionals equipped to bring fraud on investors to a halt.”55 If the Gibney court had 
asked itself the same question, it might well have reached a different conclusion.
49. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014) (“The mutual funds themselves are public 
companies that have no employees. Hence, if the whistle is to be blown on fraud detrimental to mutual 
fund investors, the whistleblowing employee must be on another company’s payroll . . . . Contractors . . . 
are not ordinarily positioned to control someone else’s workers.”).
50. Id. at 1171. 
51. Id. 
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1162. The primary parallel statutory text in question was 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2012), from which 
the Court inferred that Congress borrowed SOX’s whistleblower protection against retaliation. Lawson, 
134 S. Ct. at 1162. The “whistleblower protective aims” were against retaliatory actions taken by the 
employer if the employee were to engage in whistleblowing activity, thus protecting the shareholders. 
Id. at 1161–62.
54. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1168 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
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 The Gibney court, however, considered it “clear that the Lawson decision was 
partially motivated by the . . . unusual structure of the mutual fund industry.”56 The 
court acknowledged “some factual similarities” between the cases, but distinguished 
the case from Lawson by arguing that Gibney was “fundamentally different in that it 
d[id] not implicate the peculiar structure of the mutual fund industry.”57 The court 
thus used an interesting—but ultimately inconsequential—factual difference to bolster 
its finding that § 1514A was not intended to reach the conduct at issue in Gibney.
 In distinguishing the two cases, the court gave short shrift to important factual 
similarities. Given the broader anti-fraud purposes of SOX as a whole, the court 
should have weighed the similarities more heavily than the mutual fund industry 
distinction. In Lawson, some of the alleged fraudulent activity consisted of overstating 
expenses incurred by the contractor in managing the mutual funds.58 Such alleged 
fraud, the Court noted, “directly implicates the funds’ shareholders: ‘By inflating its 
expenses . . . [the contractor] could potentially increase the fees it would earn from 
the mutual funds, fees ultimately paid by the shareholders of those funds.’”59 In 
Gibney, the alleged fraud similarly involved overbilling by the contractor against the 
public company. As the Gibney court itself noted, “[t]he same logic” applied to both 
activities: The inf lated costs associated with Evolution’s double-billing “would 
ultimately be paid by Merck’s shareholders, as in Lawson’s case.”60 The Gibney court 
erred in emphasizing that the alleged fraud in its case took place in a “fundamentally 
different” industry over the fact that the alleged fraud itself was, in both cases, 
fundamentally similar.61
 Second, the Gibney court failed to give proper weight to the statutory text of § 
1514A. Specifically, the court failed to take proper cognizance of § 1514A(a)(1)’s 
broad language outlawing retaliatory discrimination against whistleblowers who 
provide information “relating to fraud against shareholders.”62 In its discussion of the 
breadth of SOX’s whistleblower protection, the court heavily stressed that Gibney 
alleged that the defendant contractor committed fraud against its client.63 The court 
asserted, “[n]othing in the text of § 1514  .  .  . suggests that SOX was intended to 
encompass every situation in which any party takes an action that has some attenuated, 
56. Gibney v. Evolution Mktg. Research, LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d 741, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
57. Id. 
58. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1164.
59. Id. at 1173 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 3, Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014) (No. 12-3)). 
60. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 747.
61. See id.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
63. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 747–48 (“Here, however, Plaintiff has not alleged that he blew the whistle on 
fraud committed by Merck  .  .  .  . Rather, Plaintiff is alleging that Evolution committed fraud against 
Merck.”).
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negative effect on the revenue of a publicly-traded company . . . .”64 To do so, the court 
warned, would risk making SOX an overbroad “general anti-retaliation statute.”65
 This distinction between fraud committed by a public company—either itself or 
through its contractor—versus fraud committed against a public company, and thus, 
indirectly, its shareholders, is not found within the relevant text of § 1514A. 
Furthermore, the Gibney court explicitly rejected Evolution’s claim that Gibney’s 
allegations did not relate to fraud against shareholders.66 The court thus acknowledged 
that Evolution’s alleged misconduct did relate to shareholders. According to the 
“plain meaning”67 of the text, the plaintiff would therefore be entitled to § 1514A’s 
protection against whistleblower retaliation. The court provided no compelling 
reason to support its finding that retaliation for Gibney’s allegations was unavailable 
under § 1514A, despite it having conceded that those allegations related to fraud. 
Instead, the court merely concluded, “Plaintiff advocates for an impermissibly broad 
definition of SOX protection.”68 It based that conclusion on the argument that such 
a definition “was neither intended by Congress nor contemplated by the Supreme 
Court in Lawson.”69
 The Gibney court placed significant weight on the Lawson Court’s discussion of 
one of the immediate precursors to SOX’s passage; namely, the Enron accounting 
scandal. The Supreme Court discussed Enron at length; it noted in the first line of 
its opinion that Congress enacted SOX “[t]o safeguard investors in public companies 
and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of Enron 
Corporation.”70 Even more pointedly, it noted that “[i]t is common ground that 
Congress installed whistleblower protection in [SOX] as one means to ward off 
another Enron debacle.”71 The Gibney court apparently presumed that the Lawson 
64. Id. at 748.
65. Id. The court felt that applying § 1514A would create a general anti-retaliation statute because Evolution 
was defrauding Merck, and Merck was not harming its own shareholders. Id. at 747–48; see also Safarian 
v. Am. DG Energy Inc., No. 10-6082, 2014 WL 1744989, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014) (“Though 
overbilling might eventually lead to incorrect accounting records and tax submissions, these kinds of 
disclosures were not contemplated by the statute, have not been protected by other courts, and should 
fall outside the scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, 622 Fed. App’x 149 (3d 
Cir. 2015). But cf. Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 135 (3rd Cir. 2013) (finding that a misstatement of 
accounting records and a fraudulent tax deduction were sufficient to support a plausible inference of a 
violation of SOX).
66. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 747.
67. This term is a well-established principle of statutory construction that is used to decipher the meaning of 
statutory text by defining words in accordance with their ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Moskal v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“‘In determining the scope of a statute, [judges] look first to its language,’ 
giving the ‘words used’ their ‘ordinary meaning.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); then quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
68. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 747.
69. Id. 
70. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014).
71. Id. at 1169.
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Court’s analysis of the interplay between the Enron fiasco and SOX’s passage 
indicated Lawson’s intention to limit the extent of the statute’s whistleblower 
protection to closely analogous situations.
 In focusing on Lawson’s Enron-specific language, however, the Gibney court failed 
to adequately consider the Lawson Court’s broader language regarding SOX’s overall 
anti-fraud purposes. Nodding to a Senate report that identified outside professionals as 
“gatekeepers who detect and deter fraud,”72 the Supreme Court noted that “[f]rom this 
legislative history, one can safely conclude that Congress enacted § 1514A to encourage 
whistleblowing by contractor employees who suspect fraud involving the public 
companies with whom they work.”73 Involve is defined as “to relate closely.”74 Therefore, 
the use of “involving” in § 1514A should have been construed to broaden, not limit, its 
scope and include any suspected fraud that relates to the public companies. Thus, in 
Gibney, although Evolution perpetrated the fraud against Merck, the fraud involved 
Merck, and would indirectly affect its shareholders, causing Evolutions’ actions to fit 
within the intended meaning of § 1514A.75
 Moreover, broad language in the context of laws designed to regulate the 
securities markets is commonplace. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, for example, proscribes the “use or employ[ment], in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any [registered or unregistered] security . . . [of] any manipulative 
or deceptive device or contrivance.”76 And the Supreme Court has “repeatedly 
recognized that securities laws combating fraud should be construed ‘not technically 
and restrictively, but f lexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.’”77 In another 
securities-related case of statutory first impression, the Supreme Court similarly 
noted that it would be “guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that 
remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.”78 Thus, 
§ 1514A’s plain meaning, bolstered further by the broadly remedial nature of the 
underlying statute itself, and the Supreme Court’s guidance on the interpretation of 
remedial legislation in general and in the context of securities regulation in particular, 
indicate that the Gibney court erred, not only in its emphasis on trivial factual 
differences over significant factual similarities, but also in statutory interpretation.
 Third, the Gibney court, in addition to misreading the signals from Lawson 
regarding the breadth of SOX’s whistleblower protection, misconstrued Congress’s 
broader legislative intent. According to the Gibney court, “in enacting SOX Congress 
was specifically concerned with preventing shareholder fraud either by the public 
72. Id. at 1170 (quoting S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 20 (2002)).
73. Id. (emphasis added). 
74. Involve, Merriam-Webster, https://www.m-w.com/dictionary/involve (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
75. Gibney v. Evolution Mktg. Research, LLC, 25 F. Supp. 3d 741, 747 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
76. Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012)).
77. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983) (alteration in original) (quoting SEC 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
78. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
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company itself or through its contractors.”79 The legislative history surrounding SOX’s 
passage may indicate that Congress was specifically concerned with preventing a 
repeat performance of such fraud, but it also indicates that Congress was not solely 
concerned with that specific scenario. The Gibney court acknowledged that 
“Congress’ central concern in enacting SOX” was “protecting shareholders.”80 SOX’s 
broadly remedial nature is evident from the congressional record surrounding its 
passage. A Senate report specifically discussing Title VIII of SOX emphasized the 
importance of “[a]ccountability and transparency” in “restor[ing] confidence in the 
integrity of the public markets.”81 The report stressed that Enron was “only a case 
study” that indicated the need to reform the securities laws to prevent “[f]uture 
debacles.”82 According to the report, examples such as Enron “further expose a 
culture, supported by law, that discourage[s] employees from reporting fraudulent 
behavior not only to the proper authorities  .  .  . but even internally.  .  .  . The 
consequences . . . for investors in publicly traded companies, in particular, and for the 
stock market, in general, are serious and adverse, and they must be remedied.”83
 While the Senate report discusses the Act’s whistleblower protection provisions 
in the context of public company employees, the Gibney court should have broadened 
its analysis of congressional intent to consider the purposeful inclusion of those 
provisions in the overall Act. In other words, the court should have considered not 
only Congress’s words specifically regarding the whistleblower protection, but also 
the intended scope of that protection in the context of the Act’s overall purpose.84
 The Gibney court erred in declining to extend protection to contractor employees 
who blow the whistle on fraudulent activity that ultimately defrauds investors in 
publicly traded companies. The court mistakenly distinguished Gibney from Lawson; 
it focused on the particular nature of the mutual fund industry at issue in the latter 
case but failed to sufficiently consider the more important factual similarities between 
the actual fraudulent activities in both cases. Additionally, the court gave insufficient 
weight to the statutory text of § 1514A. The court read a requirement into the statute 
that protection would apply only with respect to allegations of fraud committed by 
the company—either directly or through its contractors—when the statutory 
language explicitly extends protection to allegations relating to fraud. The court 
failed to read the statutory language in the proper context. Concerned with the 
79. Gibney, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 747; id. at 748 (“[T]he specific shareholder fraud contemplated by SOX is that 
in which a public company—either acting on its own or acting through its contractors—makes material 
misrepresentations about its financial picture in order to deceive its shareholders.”).
80. Id. at 747.
81. S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 11 (2002).
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 5; see also H.R. Doc. No. 107-414, at 16 (2002) (aiming to “protect investors by improving the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”). 
84. This is consistent with the statutory canon of construction in pari materia, which states that statutes 
“may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another 
statute on the same subject.” In pari materia, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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potential for over breadth, the Gibney court failed to recognize the broadly remedial 
purposes behind § 1514A and SOX, and the guidance proffered by the Supreme 
Court in interpreting remedial legislation in general and in the securities regulation 
and anti-fraud contexts. Finally, the court misread the broader legislative intent 
behind SOX’s whistleblower protection provisions. In doing so, the court neglected 
to further Congress’s intent to strengthen protection for whistleblowers in a broad 
range of public-company related activities that could potentially defraud investors.

SIM CITY
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
www.nylslawreview.com
